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I. Introduction 
Since the end of the East-West-Conflict, two phenomena have gained 
steady relevance in international relations: globalization and regional inte-
gration. While both seem to be tied to the “still nebulous” (Hettne 1999: 1) 
concept of a “new world order”, scholars have not yet agreed on a sound 
definition of both phenomena. At least, their historic origin seems to be ob-
vious: the end of the East-West-conflict. The process has been evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary. The same is the case for the peaceful transforma-
tion of former socialist or communist systems into democracies. The pro-
cess took almost two decades, for instance in the “new” member states of 
the European Union (EU). The fall of the iron curtain and the implosion of 
the Soviet Union exacerbated the disintegration of the “competition of sys-
tems” (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 51) that had characterized international 
relations for 50 years. To some, the end of the East-West-conflict and the 
changes it caused are hardly comparable to any historic event – at least 
since the end of World War II (Czempiel 1993).  
The new options of political positioning went along with huge political and 
economic challenges. Old alliances were replaced by new ones motivating 
former adversaries to extend their hands towards each other. The most sig-
nificant example is the decision of former East-Block-countries to join Cordula Janowski 
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NATO and the EU. This step required a full democratic transformation in 
the relevant countries at the example of the former political counterpart. 
Reforms included economic reorientation, the invariable respect for human 
rights, and a fundamentally changed political agenda. The EU’s “new” 
neighbors since 2004 prove that dissociation from the Russian Federation 
was the common strategy of all states that were formerly under Soviet-
influence. Nevertheless, democratic transformation succeeded only in cer-
tain countries, among them the eight new EU-members from Eastern 
Europe. Countries like “late-Stalinist” (Michels/Zervakis 2005: 261) Bela-
rus have yet to begin reforms. Also Ukraine, Moldova, countries in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, show that political, legal and economic renewal 
is a painful process for governing elites, who may try to avoid such deve-
lopments by any means.  
While the bipolar world order disappeared, two conflicting desires ap-
peared in its stead: the wish to create a world free of barriers – especially of 
economic ones – on the one hand, and the desire to cooperate with 
neighboring countries on the other. The latter, regional integration, is far 
from being a new phenomenon, as early studies date back to the 1960s and 
1970s (Csillaghy 1965; Schmitter 1972). Yet, those analyses were rather 
moderate in number and extent. While early studies mainly focused on ini-
tiatives in former “Third World” countries, they also understood regional 
integration as an instrument for economic and political development in de-
veloping countries (Rinke 1970, Yadi 1979). Recent reflections endeavor to 
broaden the view and choose a comparative approach: they understand re-
gional integration as a global process. This heralded a change in research 
interest: regional integration is “back in fashion” (Higgott 1998: 42), but 
not only. Recent studies have started to compare integrative experience in 
different world regions to gain a deep insight into the dynamics of integra-
tion-processes. They do so not only for empirical interest, but also to dis-
cuss whether there is a “best practice” of regional integration.  
Notably the EU – an example of successful regional integration (Murray 
2004; Laursen 1999; Laffan 1997) – has elicited a strong attraction. Re-
cently, a new question emerged: is the EU a model for regional integration 
or even the global paradigm? Experts agree that it is not possible to simply Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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copy the EU-system in other world regions (Kühnhardt 2004; Murray: 
2004; Laffan: 1997) – at least unless countries go through the process of 
political and legal unification as the EU-countries did (Laffan 1997). In-
deed, political unification is in some regions not the objective at all, as it is 
the case for instance for the governments of East-Asian countries (Beeson 
and Jayasuriya 1998: 316). Nevertheless, the creation of a free-trade area 
resembling the Single European Market (SEM) is widely observed with 
increasing interest. One question remains: where does the growing attrac-
tion of regional integration stem from?  
A second development that is to be observed since the late 70s is the rising 
internationalization of trade relations. Since the 90s, this phenomenon has 
been subsumed under the term globalization. Globalization has become the 
political catchword in debates on international development. In 2001, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung – one of Germany’s leading national 
newspapers – found that they used the word more than 1,136 times (data: 
Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 49). A sound scientific definition of the word is 
still missing. Nevertheless, politicians have tried to approach the term. In 
1999, the German Bundestag set up a ad-hoc-committee (Enquete-
Kommission) to explore in detail the historic origin of globalization, the 
challenges it brings up for modern societies and possible answers 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1999). In its final report, the Enquete-Kommission 
classifies globalization as an inevitable development that was only partially 
positive. The Enquete-Kommission stated as well that globalization had 
become one of the most important political topics. Many issues of daily 
politics were mainly linked to this phenomenon, among them strategies to 
overcome unemployment, a proper tax-policy, support for the least deve-
loped countries, environmental and climate protection and others. Due to 
the Enquete-Kommission, those urgent issues were to be seen in direct rela-
tion to globalization (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 49). More optimistic ap-
proaches consider globalization as a huge opportunity for modern 
industrialized nations, one which they just have to realize to take advantage 
of the political and economic options that go along with globalization 
(Schirm 2003).  Cordula Janowski 
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Whether we agree to more positive or rather skeptical positions on glo-
balization, it is assumable that globalization and regional integration are 
related issues. The following reflections will analyze the theoretical debate 
on globalization and regional integration and the special case of the EU. Is 
the EU a possible model for regional efforts in other world regions and to 
which extent? The answer to this question is closely tied to the novel de-
bate on globalization and regionalization. Both phenomena can hardly be 
isolated from the changes and challenges that started in the early 1980s, but 
how far are globalization and regionalization linked to each other? This pa-
per will argue that both developments are two sides of the same coin that 
contradict each other, but condition each other at the same time.  
The following chapter will analyze globalization and regional integration as 
an inter-dependant process of a challenge and its response. Based on this, 
the analysis will discuss the EU’s role in this process. The high attraction 
of the EU on other world regions requires a closer look on European inte-
gration. Could or is the EU a possible global paradigm for regional integra-
tion? Doubts are justified on the assumption that the European model as a 
whole could be imitated by other regions to automatically achieve the same 
effects (Murray 2004; Kühnhardt 2004). Nevertheless, singular features of 
European integration may motivate other regions to follow a similar track. 
The creation of a common market may be one. These reflections allow a 
few concluding thoughts that will plead for a broader view on globaliza-
tion, regional integration and the EU. 
II. Globalization and Regional Integration: a Challenge 
and its Response 
Since the early 90s we have observed a “global proliferation” (Kühnhardt 
2004: 4) of regionalism. This coincides with a growing interest on EU-
integration in almost every region of the world. The EU itself observes the 
growing interest in its system of governance rather passively: The EU un-
derstands itself as a “soft power” (Lamy/Laidi 2001: 10) with little inten-
tion of serving as global paradigm. In 1995, a short-time before the initial 
Asia-Europe-Meeting (ASEM) took place in Bangkok, the EU stated that it Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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did not consider its process of integration as model for regional integration 
in other parts of the world or even as the global paradigm. In clear words 
the EU-Commission clarified that the European model of integration “can 
only serve as a source of experience” (European Parliament 1997: 1). The 
European way was not “directly transferable” to other parts of the world 
(Ibd.). The “export” of the EU’s model of integration was not even a topic 
on the EU’s agenda. Nevertheless, the EU promised to support economic 
and political development in other world regions, especially in countries of 
the former “Third World”. The “external support for regional economic 
integration” especially in developing regions was of “great importance” – 
for the relevant countries as well as for the EU. And because of its integra-
tion process, the EU found itself as “particularly well placed to assume a 
leading role in this field” (Ibd.). To do this, the EU has launched different 
strategies and agreements of economic, political and legal cooperation as 
well as of financial support, among them the ASEM, the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area or the Cotonou-agreement. 
1. The Challenge: Globalization 
The historical origin of globalization is hard to define. Some date glo-
balization back to the visits of China’s “modernizer” (Die Zeit 35/2004) 
Deng Xiaoping to the Tiger states in 1979. China started in the late 1970s 
to reform its political economy and liberalized trade relations step by step. 
The success of reforms finally allowed China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Chinas progress definitely 
had an influence on the globalization. Still, it seems that globalization has 
been a rather evolutionary process that was only lately discovered as new 
development. One piece of evidence lies in the fact that the internationali-
zation of trade relations dates back to the Middle Ages. During the indus-
trial revolution, trade became “global” as the technical development 
allowed merchants to establish regular trade relations allover the globe. 
Modern globalization seems to have its origins in recent history after the 
end of the East-West conflict. Indeed, developments of the “new” world 
after 1989 seem to have fostered the process. The driving force behind 
globalization is the liberalization of trade relations. The EC-countries Cordula Janowski 
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started to liberalize trade among themselves in 1957. While tariffs could be 
abolished with the completion of the European Customs Union, only in 
1993 did the EC ban the various non-tariff trade-barriers that were compli-
cating EC-domestic trade until then. The liberalization of trade and markets 
within the EC was but one step towards a SEM. More sophisticated steps 
took years, like the establishment of a common competition law to avoid 
distortion of competition by uncontrolled state aid, monopolies, and uncon-
trolled establishment of trusts. Those forced EC-members to act according 
to the Treaties and often against national interest. 
The reduction of tariffs and similar trade barriers is a main driver of glo-
balization. During the last decades, WTO-rounds have fostered this process 
strongly as they tried to reduce trade barriers on single products especially 
for reasons of economic development of less and least developed countries. 
The WTO-round of Hong Kong stressed the necessity “to ensure the … 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export 
measures” (WTO 2005: 2). Disputed matters on the agenda of the Hong 
Kong WTO-round were again agricultural products like cotton (WTO 
2005: A-1 ff.). Several industrialized countries still impose on agricultural 
imports from developing countries rigorous quotas and high tariffs. The 
German Bundestag points out that customs on industrial products that were 
traded between industrialized countries were reduced in average by 85% 
between 1950 and 1984: in 1950, up to 40% of prices of industrial goods 
were tariffs. Until 1984, this share was reduced to 6%. (data: Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002: 50). The main reason for this development is the liberali-
zation of trade within the EC-zone and between the EC and associated 
countries.  
The reductions on tariffs lead to a strong development of external trade. In 
2000, exports had reached 19-times the volume of 1950 (data: Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002: 51). In addition to this, the number of direct investments 
has been growing constantly since the 80s and trade on capital markets has 
been intensified significantly. Since 1982, the number of direct investments 
has grown at a multiple than the gross domestic product (GDP) in industri-
alized states did: during the 1990s, the GDP in industrialized countries 
grew at 50%. At the same time, the volume of direct investments grew by Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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more than five times of the GDP. Between 1989 and 2000, the turnover in 
foreign exchange markets increased from 600 billion US-$ to 1,100 billion 
US-$ with a peak of 1,500 billion US-$ in 1998 (data: Deutscher Bundestag 
2002: 64). The turnover of share or interest bound derivatives increased at 
six times between 1990 and 2001 and reached almost 600,000 billion US-$ 
in 2001 (data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 66). 
Especially the liberalization of capital markets gave reason to look at glo-
balization with some scepticism. To some, globalization is a project that is 
driven primarily by private actors who wish to raise their materialist advan-
tage on financial markets by acting free of barriers. Actors on capital mar-
kets obviously aim at increasing their wealth. Critical voices evaluate this 
as unscrupulous and as behavior free of ethical standards. Some even con-
sider globalization an inhuman process that was started mainly as an An-
glo-American project to control global natural resources (Klees 2003: 5). 
To those, the effect would be a retreat or even end of the nation state and 
not only this: while huge multi-national corporations would gain essential 
influence, political actors – first of all governments – would steadily lose 
power. As a result, regional and global governmental organizations like the 
EU and the United Nations would lose influence over politics (Klees 2003: 
5). As a long term result, civil war even in a peaceful region like Western 
Europe could no longer be excluded as the overall effect of globalization 
(Klees 2003: 6). The only conclusion one may draw from such a rather 
apocalyptic analysis is that ending globalization is the only answer. But 
two questions remain: is it possible to stop globalization? And even more: 
is it advisable to do so or is globalization but the continuation of interna-
tional relations under the measurement that the concept of a socialist or 
communist order has lost the competition against a liberal democracy in 
Western-style? 
On the basis of its 624-page report, the Enquete-Kommission of the Ger-
man Bundestag argues that an uncontrolled or maybe even uncontrollable 
liberalization of markets – especially global financial markets – would un-
dermine the power of political actors steadily. States themselves became 
objects of competition with the effect that the primacy of politics was en-
dangered. The primacy of politics had to be re-ensured to regain control Cordula Janowski 
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over private economic actors. Governments had to regain full control of the 
main instrument of political decision making – the power of regulation 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 466 f., 477). The assumption is widely shared 
that globalization weakens a state’s authority and its primacy of power. Re-
cent studies of political scientists analyze the effects of globalization on 
political systems and draw a similar conclusion. They argue that globaliza-
tion weakens the power and autonomy of nation-states that steadily lose 
influence especially on economic actors. The reason seems to be evident: 
nation-states’ influence is determined by the states’ territories, while cross-
border activities may require tedious and delicate diplomatic efforts. Actors 
of globalization, mainly multinational corporations, cross borders easily 
and may enter markets without huge efforts. States do not only miss this 
flexibility, but maybe also limited by general political issues in or around 
the state. In the effect, states lose influence, while actors of globalization 
gain power. The “Retreat of the State” (Strange 1996) that some observe, 
goes along with increasing options for multinationals to exert influence es-
pecially in economic matters. In the long run, this would lead to the estab-
lishment of a “parallel authority” next to national governments (Strange 
1996: 65). Some analyses even predict “The End of the Nation State” (Oh-
mae 1995): the loss of influence will be strong enough for states to disinte-
grate, while regional economies grow. 
To underscore the assumption that globalization bears several “dangers” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 47), critics of globalization refer to the conse-
quences of globalization for the individual. For many people in the world, 
they argue, globalization has turned out to be less advantageous as regards 
financial means and living conditions. It is true that the gap between the 
wealthy and the poor increased during the last years significantly. The 
growth of per-capita income slowed down from an annual growth rate of 
83% between 1960 and 1980 to 33% in 2000 (Hetzer 2003: 28). The gap of 
prosperity between the richest 20% of the world’s population and its poor-
est 20% increased from a ratio of 1:30 in 1960 to a ratio of 1:72 in 1998 
(data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 55). Between 1988 and 1998, the num-
ber of paupers, who live on an income of less than US-$ 1 per day, in-
creased by more than 100 million people (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 539). Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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Most affected by those problems more than ever are women. The “femini-
zation of poverty” is “an observed reality in many places” (UNIFEM 2005: 
37). The gap between rich and poor appears also in shares on the gross 
world product (GWP): in 1999, the G-7-countries produced almost 65% of 
the GWP, while the G-77 countries produced 15% only. The share of the 
least developed countries on the GWP was 1%. At the same time, the G-7 
countries represented 10% of the world’s population, while the G-77 coun-
tries represented almost 75% (data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 62). The 
different shares on the GWP go along with different global income shares: 
between 1960 and 1997, the share of the richest 20% on global income in-
creased from 72% to over 90%. At the same time, the income share of the 
poorest 20% decreased from less than 3% in 1960 to 1% in 1990 (data: 
Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 62). 
As alarming as those facts are, there is no evidence that globalization is the 
cause for those developments. In fact, per capita income increases in most 
countries of the world and even in least developed countries (data: UCSC 
2006). The spread of cross-border trade and the liberalization of societies 
have unveiled grievances that have been known ever since. Globalization 
has also heated the debate on “good” governance. Many problems of less 
and least developed countries seem to be “home-made”: they are caused by 
corrupt elites, instable political systems, diffuse legal standards, an uncon-
trolled economic system and the inability to overcome ancient societal or 
cultural standards. Interestingly, the allocation of income and wealth is 
more drastic in less and least developed countries than in industrialized 
countries. The gap between the 20% richest and the 20% poorest people in 
Germany is 4.1, in the US it is 9.4. This appears small in comparison to 
Brazil with a gap of 25 between the 20% poorest and the 20% richest of the 
population (data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 58). The reasons for this gap 
cannot be analyzed in depth at this point. Still, it is assumable that the un-
just allocation of income in Brazil goes back to some characteristic deficits 
in Brazilian political system like the concentration of real estate property in 
the hands of a small elite, the privileged position of wealthy families in po-
litical and social life, the weak de facto protection of the individual and the Cordula Janowski 
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overall lack of a strong state under the rule of law including an administra-
tion that implements law consistently. 
International Organizations like the World Bank and the OECD started dur-
ing the 1980s to outline the relation of economic development and “good 
governance“ with the statement that “good governance matters” also for 
economic development (Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2005a: 39). The fact 
that International Organizations that dedicate themselves to development 
and protection of human beings deal with governance in the course of eco-
nomic development shows how globalization, its consequences and the 
way elites rule “their” countries relate to each other. Main features of 
“good governance” include aspects whose absence in less developed coun-
tries has been criticized over decades as a main driver for under-
development. To the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), good governance fulfils eight major re-
quirements: it is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the 
rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, that the views of mi-
norities are taken into consideration and that the voices of the most vulner-
able in society are heard in the decision-making process. It is responsive to 
the present and future needs of society (UNESCAP 2006).  
The World Bank defines six “key dimensions” of good governance (Kauf-
mann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2005a: 4), on which the Bank measures almost each 
country in the world on a regular basis. Those are: voice and accountability 
to measure political, civil and human rights, political instability and vio-
lence to measure the likelihood of violent threats including terrorism, go-
vernment effectiveness to measure the competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service, regulatory burden to measure the incidence of 
market-unfriendly policies, rule of law to measure the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime as 
well as violence and control of corruption to measure the exercise of public 
power for private gain, including both “petty and grand corruption and state 
capture” (Ibd.). It is impossible to present the relevant data at this point in 
full extent. Nevertheless, the selected data already shows that poor coun-
tries tend to suffer from rather poor governance. Among 209 countries the Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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World Bank evaluated in 2004, only Western industrialized countries 
achieved a high level of governance and can be defined as countries pro-
viding “good” governance. In terms of voice and accountability for in-
stance, five countries of the EU-15 achieved a standard of more than 90% 
on the World Bank’s scale, among them Germany, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Norway and Denmark. Among the countries with the least stan-
dard of voice and accountability (bottom 10%) were developing countries 
only, some of them least developed countries like Eritrea, Sudan and Soma-
lia. Even new EU-members Estonia, Poland and Hungary stayed in 2004 
below 90% with regards to voice and accountability (data: Kauf-
mann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2005b: 18).  
A similar tendency is to be observed when examining the effectiveness of 
administration. In 2004, the US, Canada, Australia as well as the Scandina-
vian countries, UK, Ireland and a few other countries of the EU-15 were 
fully efficient with their administrations and public services (above 90%). 
The southern EU-countries showed less efficiency (75-90%), mainly due to 
exaggerated bureaucratic hurdles. Almost all developing countries and all 
of the least developed countries suffered from moderately efficient or inef-
ficient governance. The data is similar as regards the standard of rule of 
law: only governance in the Western industrialized countries consistently 
respects the rule of law (75 to over 90%), as well as single countries in the 
rest of world including Chile and South Korea (data: Kaufmann/Kraay/ 
Mastruzzi 2005b: 19 f.). Concerning control of corruption, only the OECD-
countries foster a strong control of corruption, next to a few countries from 
other parts of the world (data: Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2005b: 7). 
Those reflections show that globalization and its allegedly negative conse-
quences have to be considered in the overall context of the political, legal, 
economic and social circumstances in a certain country. The assumption 
that globalization goes along with a dangerous threat is therefore rather a 
diffuse feeling than a hard fact. Some try to empirically prove the inherent 
dangers of globalization even to Western industrialized countries by refer-
ring to the fact that multi-national companies have started to move their 
headquarters or production from countries with a high cost of labour to 
countries with cheaper cost of labour (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 54). It is Cordula Janowski 
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true that such development is disadvantageous to countries like Germany, 
whose cost of labour and tax is widely considered as high. To draw this 
back to globalization is indeed an ideological conclusion. To observe glob-
alization with a prejudiced skepticism obstructs the view on chances and 
options globalization brings up. Also, it will become hard to see the possi-
ble inter-dependence with regional integration. A negative view on glo-
balization helps little to understand both phenomena (Schirm 2003: 7). 
While the move of multi-national companies can be seen as a critical result 
of globalization, it can also be considered as the consequence of domestic 
politics’ insistent unwillingness to foster necessary reforms. There is no 
doubt that the empirical data on global poverty is dramatic and things have 
to be improved. Nevertheless, improvements have to start within the coun-
tries themselves. There is no empirical evidence that globalization is the 
cause of the misery – neither for developing, nor for industrialized coun-
tries. The opposite is the case: the main factor is in how far elites are will-
ing to reform their political, economic and legal systems, to liberalize their 
societies and to integrate on the basis of higher standards of governance 
into the world market. 
The reactions towards globalization may differ greatly: governments may 
decide to push liberalization of reforms, to raise their attractiveness to in-
vestors and to create incentives (Schirm 2003: 11). States may also pre-
serve or even intensify protectionist measurements to protect their own 
markets or their own privileges. As regards the rule of law for instance, 
some developing countries have deteriorated their situation: the World 
Bank stated in 2004 that things have become significantly worse since 1996 
in Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast or Central African Republic (formerly Congo) 
(data: Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2005b: 28 f.). Those countries may con-
duct strong business relations to other countries, as Zimbabwe does with 
China, and profit from sales of natural resources. Only a small part of those 
profits will be reinvested in the political economy of the relevant countries 
to reduce poverty. Consequently, the income gap between those who can 
dispose of natural and other resources and those who cannot will increase. 
Protectionist measurements and poor governance go along with high costs 
not only for developing countries. The huge amount of protective measures Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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in the EU’s agricultural policy has earned the EU the reputation of a “for-
tress Europe mentality” (Murray 2004: 37). Though this is exaggerated and 
in several aspects “obsolete” (Boyer 2003: 1), the number of measures that 
protect the EU’s agricultural sector is still high, as well as the cost for this 
policy: from 106.3 billion € of the EU’s funds in 2005, 46% or 49.1 billion 
€ were spent solely on the EU’s agricultural policy (EU-Commission 
2006). Another nearly 31% were spent on structural and cohesion funds, 
both accounting for more than three quarters of the EU’s budget. In con-
trast to this, the EU spent only 13% for internal and external policies (EU-
Commission 2006), including urgent topics like the protection of the EU’s 
borders and domestic security. 
One question remains: in how far does globalization affect the autonomy 
and influence of state-actors? Globalization affects economic decisions as 
well as political decision. Without any doubt, globalization has caused 
strong dependencies between states, especially in trade relations. In 1970 
for instance, only 10% of the world-wide production of industrial goods 
was traded across national borders. By 2000, the share almost tripled to 
more than 25% (Hetzer 2003: 27). The major players affecting these trade 
flows are multi national companies. In 2000, an estimated 63,000 multi-
national companies based their business on 800,000 plants worldwide. Ex-
perts estimate that among the 100 biggest economic units, there are 52 
multi-national companies and only 48 states (Hetzer 2003: 28). Apart from 
the task of controlling and regulating business activities of those companies 
efficiently, modern states face a range of further challenges, some of them 
directly, some of them indirectly related to cross-border trade-relations. 
One of the “hot topics” during the last two decades has been environmental 
protection. This includes climate protection, cleanliness and allocation of 
water resources, reduction of waste and of environmental pollution in ge-
neral.  
A steady topic has been health standards and the protection against disease. 
Social standards have become a topic in recent years – as regards social 
gaps and the defense of illegal migration. The attacks from September 11 
have shown the necessity to fight organized crime more efficiently, in-
cluding crime that is driven by material reasons like money laundering, Cordula Janowski 
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drugs and human trafficking as well as ideologically driven terrorism. Ex-
perts estimate that drug trafficking earns turnovers of annually 400 to 500 
billion US-$. Only 100 to 500 million US-$ per year can be secured by the 
police. Estimation on how many percent of those means enter Western 
economies differ significantly. For the US for instance, experts estimate 
that money laundering accounts for at least 4% of the GDP. The highest 
estimation assumes that the share is almost 34%. For Germany, lowest es-
timations assume less than 3% of the GDP, highest estimation go up to 
11% (data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 80). 
The problems are severe and urgent. It is evident that the nation-state has 
become too small to face the challenge alone (Boyer 2003: 1). This does 
not mean the inevitable decay of states. In fact, the conditions for govern-
mental decisions have changed significantly. Political actors are forced to 
consider the global economic and political developments much more than 
they may have done in the past. The state will not retreat from power, but 
political or economic strategies that ignore the new developments will lead 
to suboptimal results (Schirm 2003: 8). This means that globalization does 
not weaken the state per se. But it changes states’ options for actions in 
core questions of domestic policy as well as of the economy or foreign po-
litical relations. Nation states may face a fierce competition for foreign in-
vestments and trade options. They may have to justify and defend their 
advantage of location. States may also have to justify isolation from 
neighbors and political solo strategies to their population. Citizens and poli-
ticians may put pressure on states to solve issues on a super-national level. 
Aspects that diminish the attraction of states critically may come to the sur-
face as hidden corruption, a high density of regulations that complicate 
business, as indirect subsidies and monopolies that distort competition, as 
discrimination of foreigners and little reliability on the implementation of 
legal requirements especially in the civil law etc. 
Those reflections show that globalization does not cause a decay of states 
and state-institutions, but may limit political options for governments, es-
pecially if those governments simply ignore the expectations of global eco-
nomic players (Schirm 2003: 8). This is especially the case for states that 
are integrated to global markets to a large amount and that depend on trade Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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options. When we observe global trade flows, we will interestingly find 
that trade flows are concentrated on several regions. Almost 70% of West-
ern Europe’s trade flows take place within the SEM. External trade within 
Europe is therefore in fact internal, i.e. taking place within the SEM (Boyer 
2003: 2). The same is true for other regions: trade flows in North American 
sum up to 40%, Asian countries conduct 47% of trade flows within the re-
gion (Ibd.). The major external trade partner for EU-countries is the US 
(24.3%). For the US, the most important trade partners are Canada and the 
EU-countries (EU-Commission 2004). This means that the US, the EU-
countries as well as newly industrialized countries like China that depend 
on cross-border trade, are affected by globalization automatically. The only 
rational political option is therefore, to adapt to the new expectations or 
face serious disadvantages otherwise. Countries, that have the economic 
power to do so, may procrastinate the process by launching protective 
measurements. The necessary steps may become even more urgent at a 
later point of time.  
To sum up, globalization is a phenomenon that mainly affects the OECD-
countries including its emerging members (Schirm 2003: 9). It is a “com-
mon fallacy” (Boyer 2003: 1) that globalization affects all other nations in 
the world in the same way, even if they interact with large trans-national 
companies. But countries that exclude themselves from the world market 
by avoiding necessary political and economic reforms will face huge eco-
nomic disadvantages as well. Therefore, government beyond statehood has 
become a requirement (Zürn 1998). To ensure good governance in times of 
globalization, scholars and politicians even plead for a system of global 
governance. To establish such a system, states would have to build global 
super-national institutions. To solve issues that affect several nations in the 
same way, they would have to develop global standards and methods of 
problem solving (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 419). A desirable long-term 
development could be a multi-level system of governance that preserves a 
central role of nation-states, while motivating them at the same time to 
transfer sovereignty onto an international or even supranational level as 
well as “down” onto the local and regional (federate) level (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002: 419 f.). The thought of a system of global governance in Cordula Janowski 
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the sense of a “non-hegemonic and pluralist collective world order” 
(Lamy/Laidi 2001: 10) is well known to EU-countries. Though “global 
governance’s heyday is still some way off” (Lamy/Laidi 2001: 9), a system 
of supranational regional governance already exists. The EU allows not 
only governance beyond statehood, it provides at the same time good go-
vernance.  
2. The Response: Regional Integration 
Until today, the EU has been the only regional organization with a suprana-
tional approach. Nevertheless, regional integration is no longer a unique 
development. During the last decades, almost every world-region has initi-
ated integrative measures at least once.
1 Yet “regionalism”
2 after 1989 
seems to be different to former initiatives (Laursen 1999: 67). One reason 
is that in the bipolar world of East and West, regional initiatives were as-
signed to one of the poles. Regional initiatives appeared as a sub-
development of one of the two political sides. In contrast to this, regional-
ism after 1989 is multipolar and driven by fundamentally different ideas. 
Regionalism and regional integration after 1989 are a “new” development 
in contrast to the “old” regionalism of cold-war-times (Hettne 1999: 7). 
The question remains: what has been the main driver for regional integra-
tion after 1989? The end of the East-West-conflict seems to have left a 
vacuum severe enough for states to cooperate with geographical neighbors. 
The scientific community has not yet agreed on a sound definition of re-
gionalism and regional integration
3 that are often used synonymously. Nev-
ertheless, both imply some basic requirements: the process of regional 
integration goes along with a momentum of consolidation, determination 
and the pooling of common interests. The level of integration may range 
from a loose cooperation to the pooling of national sovereignty, as is the 
case for the EU. At any rate, regional integration requires a commitment of 
states to a political, economic or legal objective. The degree of “self-
 
1   For a complete overview over regional initiatives after 1989 see Kühnhardt (2004). 
2    The term “regional integration” describes a unique phenomenon. “Regionalism” 
indicates a global movement. 
3   Compare e.g. Laursen (1999: 67) for two different approaches. Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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abandonment” to the common thing may vary significantly. Nonetheless, 
regional integration without the lowest common commitment is unthink-
able. 
Some regional alliances hold very low thresholds for membership. They 
aim at a rather loose, non-political association. The Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) for instance leaves no doubt about its purely eco-
nomic objectives: it already avoids the term “member state”. APEC-
members are “Member Economies”, though APEC’s objectives include 
political issues like the creation of “an environment for the secure and effi-
cient movement of goods, services and people across borders in the region 
through political alignment and economic and technical cooperation” 
(APEC 2003: 2). APEC’s institutional structures underscore its mere inter-
governmental character. Supranational elements of any kind do not exist. 
Regional associations like APEC show that the objectives of regional inte-
grative efforts may vary notably.  
Associations like APEC require little more than that member states respect 
a few very basic common understandings. One of them is that member 
countries geographically belong to the APEC-region. APEC does not aim 
at the establishment of a supranational organization. This goes along with a 
general understanding of regional integration in East Asia: East Asian 
countries tend to understand regional integration as a means to consolidate 
and enhance national power (Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998: 316). Pooling 
political and legal sovereignty on a regional level as the EU does is not an 
aim. This allows regional cooperation of states whose political structures 
differ fundamentally. The systematic structure of countries of the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for instance is as manifold as 
could be. ASEAN unifies solid democracies as well as autocracies. The 
EU’s thresholds for membership are incomparably higher and driven by the 
necessity to retain the relative homogeneity that characterizes EU-Europe. 
At any rate, regional integration forms a counterpart to globalization. On 
first sight, globalization appears as the mere opposite to regional integra-
tion. Globalization is driven by the ideal of a “borderless world”, in which 
“territory has lost all importance and functionalism is predominant” (Hettne Cordula Janowski 
20   
1999: 2). Regional integration aims at the opposite: the reestablishment of 
barriers by establishing an association whose members open their markets 
to each other, but close them against “outside” countries. Indeed, the inten-
sity of regional integration varies. It is widely agreed that the EU is the 
most developed form of regional integration that currently exists (Laffan 
1997: 1; Murray 2004: 44). European integration is qualified as a kind of 
“deep regionalism” that creates a certain “contrast to other regionalisms in 
the world” (Laffan 1997: 3).  
In general, integrative efforts may reach five degrees (Hettne 1999: 10 f.): 
on a first degree of rather natural “regionness”, the region appears as a co-
incidental geographical unit. On this basic level, regionalism does not re-
quire any kind of human interaction. The region simply exists by naturally 
given factors. As soon as states interact, regions reach a second degree of 
regionalism. Mere geographic units turn into social entities that foster 
trans-national exchange. Yet, integrative efforts stay below a standardized 
cooperation and therefore lack any kind of institutionalization or regional 
legislation. Regular political, economic or military interactions are features 
of a third degree of regional integration. At this stage, regional neighbors 
cooperate on the basis of formal standards such as common agreements etc. 
Regions develop into organized entities. Participation goes along with a 
kind of membership that distinguishes members of the regional entity from 
non-member countries that still may be part of the region. Thus, countries 
may be members of the same geographic region, while they are not mem-
bers of the regional entity. Nevertheless, on the third degree actors of re-
gional cooperation are political or economic elites only. Once a broad intra-
regional communication starts that includes actors of the civil society, a 
fourth degree of region has been reached. On this level, regional actors de-
cide on the basis of a solid organizational framework and commonly ac-
cepted values that may be formed out in (regional) legal standards. On the 
fifth and highest degree, regional entities act as subjects with an own iden-
tity, actor capability as well as structures that allow region-wide decision-
making. 
Taking the EU as example and subsuming the European Union (EU) to this 
scale of “regionness” (Hettne 1999: 11) we will find that: Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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The EU acts as a subject with a distinct identity: In external trade-
relations and economic association agreements with third countries the EU-
Commission has been the acting institution that implemented the decisions 
of the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the European Par-
liament. Most important is that trade-associations between the EU and non-
EU-countries were concluded with the EU and not with the EU-member 
states (Art. 181a, 182 ff. ECT
4). The de facto bilateral agreements with the 
EU and third countries imply a legal personality of the EU. The European 
Constitution would clarify this by stating that the EU has a legal personal-
ity (Art. I-7 TEC
5). 
The EU has actor capability: All EU-policies are shaped on the European 
level by the EU’s institutions. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two ma-
jor changes in the decision-making process that was formerly dominated by 
the Council of Ministers: the extension of the qualified majority vote 
(QMV) and the co-decision procedure (Art. 252 ECT). Both strengthened 
the supranational decision-making as the QMV allows member-states to 
simply outvote others that do not want to compromise. The extension of the 
co-decision procedure raised the pressure on the Council of Ministers to 
consider positions of the European Parliament as it gives the Parliament a 
veto-option. Apart from EC-legislation the EU has a strong actor capability 
in implementation of and compliance to EC-law (Art. 81 ff. ECT). 
The EU provides a legitimate structure of decision making: Much has 
been debated about the so called democratic deficit of the EU. Scholars 
have examined the democratic legitimacy of the EU in detail and discussed 
alternatives to the current system.
6 Nevertheless, the EU established a sys-
tem of decision-making that is highly formalized in regard to the legal basis 
as well as in regard to the procedure. Democratic legitimacy is provided 
mainly by the European Parliament as the representative of the European 
citizens and the Council of Ministers as the representative of the EU-
member states in an EU that is still an international organization and not a 
sovereign state.  
 
4   Treaty Establishing a European Community. 
5   Treaty Establishing a European Constitution. 
6   For details see Janowski (2005a). Cordula Janowski 
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The EU is a community of values: The agreement on common values in 
the TEC is notable as it accepts that the common “European” heritage is 
more than economic interests. The commitment to values that describe a 
certain kind of political system – namely a pluralist democracy – can be 
seen as a clear commitment to this system of “good” governance. A major 
example is the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR; Part II 
TEC) that was adopted in 1999 by the European Council of Nice. Though 
the ECFR was not adopted as supranational law, it protects EU-citizens 
from supranational power. The Charter sums up the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) that is part of the EC-law and binding to 
European and national authorities. Apart from this, the Charter sums up 
“civil” European values and clarifies that European integration has become 
part of societal development. 
Economic integration has been but one driver of European integration. In 
fact, political topics have always been topics of supranational policy-
making. In less than 40 years, the project that had started with the European 
Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community developed 
into a Political Union that was founded in 1992 with the Treaty of Maas-
tricht. The inner structure of the EU is unique in the world. So far, integra-
tive efforts in other world regions are based on intergovernmental 
structures, while the EU established a supranational economic, legal, politi-
cal and value community. EU-institutions generate supranational law, 
whose implementation is monitored by the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice. EC-law is supreme to national law (ECJ case 
6/64), applies to the national administration in each member state and is to 
be used by national authorities prior to national law. None of the existing 
projects of regional integration come even close to this. The North Ameri-
can Free Trade zone (NAFTA) and APEC are free trade agreements that 
resemble the European Free Trade Area (EFTA).
7 The dynamics of EU-
integration result from three basic strategic decisions made by the EC’s 
 
7    EFTA was founded in 1960 as a counter-movement to the European Economic 
Community. In fact, EFTA did not work as efficient as the supranational EC did. 
Already in 1961, protagonists of EFTA – United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland – 
applied for EC-accession. In 1973, all three countries joined the EC. Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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founders: the creation of supranational institutions after the model of na-
tional administration and with respect to the principle of separation of pow-
ers; the assignment of power of decision to the EC-level as well as the 
obligation for European institutions to create and develop “European” poli-
cies; the development of a “European” culture that extends national culture. 
Especially the last aspect is remarkable. The term is multifaceted and in-
cludes different aspects. One is the European elite that emanated from the 
EU’s institutions. Former Commission president Delors considered the 
birth of a European (political) elite as one of the success-factors of Euro-
pean integration (Delors 1993: 3). Being loyal to the European project and 
interested in its development this elite would push European integration if 
only for institutional self-interest. The EU’s culture is not merely elite-
driven. Citizens of EU-member states hold a European citizenship next to 
their national citizenships. European citizenship is backed by the four basic 
freedoms. EU-citizens have the right to move freely within the EU and ac-
cept job-positions or start a business in every EU-country. EU citizens elect 
the members of the European Parliament and can be elected into local au-
thorities in other member-states than their home country. European citizen-
ship initiated the development of a European society that yields fruits: in 
spring 2005, 54% of EU-citizens in the EU-25 thought that EU-
membership is a “good thing” (EU-Commission 2005a: 10). This is a re-
markable commitment, considering that 10 new members had just entered 
the EU in May 2004.  
The EU has also launched symbols that support the commitment to the EU 
like the “Day of Europe”, the European flag and a European anthem. These 
are part of a European “polity building” (Laffan 1997: 9) that fosters socio-
cultural integration in Europe. In June 1993, the EU defined its code of 
values that links the legal, political and economic heritage of Europe. Mo-
tivated by the desire of former East-Block countries to accede the EU, the 
Commission and the European Council summed up the value-basis of EU-
Europe during the historic Copenhagen summit. Countries “that so desire 
shall become members of the European Union” (European Council 1993: 
13) if they fulfill the “Copenhagen criteria”: Cordula Janowski 
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“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of insti-
tutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obliga-
tions of membership including adherence to the aims of (the) political, economic 
and monetary union” (European Council 1993: 13). 
The Copenhagen-criteria present the first comprehensive definition of 
European values. Still, they only sum up what had been common European 
sense before. The European Constitution names the EU’s values on promi-
nent position. The EU’s commitment to a “society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail” and which is “common to the Member States” (Art. I-2 
TEC) underlines a cultural homogeneity that determines EU-Europe from 
other parts of the world. The future will show in how far the EU will be 
strong enough to defend this cultural homogeneity. The crucial test could 
come up very soon, with Turkey lobbying to accede the EU very soon. In 
its report of October 2005 the EU-Commission has left no doubt that Tur-
key will only accede the EU when Turkey meets all Copenhagen criteria 
fully (EU-Commission 2005b). The European Council confirmed this in 
June 2006 and added that the speed of negotiations depends on Turkey’s 
willingness to push reforms (European Council 2006). In fact, there is a lot 
at stake. If the EU decided to relax entry requirements, it would endanger 
the inner political, economic, legal and value coherence. In the long run, 
European integration could regress to a lower level of “regionness”. 
The brief observation of the EU also unveils a major feature of successful 
regional integration: the discovery of similarities. Countries that are willing 
to integrate launch a learning process that leads from “relative heteroge-
neity” to an “increased homogeneity” (Hettne 1999: 11) in different as-
pects. Common strategies have to replace unilateralist leanings more and 
more. But what is the minimum requirement? The mentioned scale of re-
gional integration also differentiates the maturity of integrative efforts in 
terms of common regional achievements. A geographic unit that is “de-
limited by more or less natural physical barriers” (Hettne 1999: 10) is of 
rather arbitrary character. This would be the same case if countries were to Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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foster exchange between each other without an overall regional commit-
ment. Europe has always been characterized by a propensity for cross-
border cooperation (Wallace 2000: 40), despite the devastating war expe-
rience. A region as a social system that creates a loose “security complex” 
(Hettne 1999: 10) already shows first steps of political or economic crea-
tion. Still, determination towards a “common” goal will be low. Only at the 
moment that neighboring countries commit themselves to an organized en-
tity that requires membership and a common goal will regional integration 
be strong enough to overcome smaller political crisis. To sum up, regional 
integration has to overcome the degree of rather coincidental cooperation 
within the neighborhood. The benefit of successful integrative efforts is 
high as the EU proves. The effort that is to be invested to reach this is very 
high as well. This may be the most important lesson from EU-integration. 
A last question remains: how do globalization and regional integration re-
late to each other? The examination of the basic characteristics of EU-
integration allows an assumption. In fact, globalization and regionalization 
seem to coexist and nurture each other. EU-Europe for instance fostered the 
process of political unification that was crowned by the Economic and 
Monetary Union including a common currency, right at the moment, when 
the pressure of the “new” world order unfolded its effects most visibly. 
Globalization and regional integration contradict each other at first sight 
only. In fact, they seem to be two sides of the same coin. Both phenomena 
historically emerged almost in parallel. Globalization and regionalization 
are elements of the larger process of “global structural change” (Hettne 
1999: 2) that only created “the new world order” after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Regionalization and globalization are not alternating ways 
between which states simply have to choose. In fact, states can hardly 
avoid globalization. If states do so, they face enormous costs in regard to 
economic and political development. On the other hand, states may cooper-
ate with regional neighbors to answer the challenge. Regional agreements 
allow states to bundle their power of problem solving and decision-making. 
They force states to reduce trade barriers within a region and allow eco-
nomic actors to profit from economic advantages as soon as trade in a re-
gion starts to emerge (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 121). Regional Cordula Janowski 
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agreements allow states to answer to challenges that overstrain single 
states, like environmental problems or the fight against terrorism and or-
ganized crime. Though levels of integration differ, projects of regional in-
tegration are a basic element of governance beyond statehood that may 
develop into “global governance” (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 422) on the 
long run. 
Globalization and regional integration are therefore “twin phenomena” 
(Coleman/Underhill 1998: 3) of the same global development. They are 
linked to each other as the challenge and its response (Hettne 1999). To-
day’s number of regional initiatives is large, including almost every region 
of the world (Coleman/Underhill 1998: 5). Interestingly, regions with a low 
integrity like North Asia or the Middle East suffer from severe troubles 
(Kühnhardt 2004: 4). In contrast, “integrated” regions seem to dissociate 
from aggression. A reason may be that globalization and regionalization 
foster a pragmatic attitude on trans-national cooperation. Successful eco-
nomic “partnerships” often include former adversaries who now cooperate 
constructively. A main driver is economic interest. More than two third of 
global trade is conducted within and between the four biggest regional enti-
ties: the EU-15, NAFTA, ASEAN and the Mercado Común del Sur (Mer-
cosur) (data: Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 120). The development of 
regional entities has brought up the question of inter-regional cooperation, 
i.e. the cooperation of one regional organization with another. Today, re-
gional entities like the EU cooperate with states like the US on a “bilateral” 
basis, but also with regions like the NAFTA-zone. In the long run, regional 
organizations may be forced to cooperate on political question as well, 
while they establish a regional multilateralism.  
3. Globalization, Regional Integration and Democracy 
The fact that globalization does not force the retreat of the nation state on 
the one hand, does not mean on the other hand that states face no changes 
in regards to their inner structure. Governance beyond statehood implies 
that governments rule in a broader context than was known in the classic 
political entity called nation state. But what does this mean in detail? In 
traditional international relations, governments usually act on the basis of Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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intergovernmental negotiations. The outcome – agreements, common posi-
tions etc. – are traditionally legitimized by the governments’ prerogative 
for the relevant policy. In Germany for instance, European developments 
including EC-legislation were for many decades considered as part of the 
German government’s prerogative in foreign affairs. The German 
Bundestag only started to discover EU-issues in the 1990s as a matter con-
cerning the parliament and began to claim a right of participation (Janowski 
2005b: 72 ff.). In fact, regional integration has a “profound effect” (Cole-
man/Underhill 1998: 6) on states not only in terms of economy, but also in 
terms of institutional structures. Regional integration also forces states to 
become part of a “larger and more complex political structure” (Ibd.) that is 
the counterpart of the economic system. The more regional integration de-
velops, the more states establish regional institutions and regulations to al-
low common decision-making. States may oppose this evolutionary process 
at a high price: the block of regional political development. The EU has 
seen many of those crises, some being severe enough to question the supra-
national approach as a whole, as the crisis of the 1960s did that lead to the 
compromise of Luxemburg in 1968.  
The EU has so far overcome those crises. Apart from this, other regional 
projects attempt to develop supranational or at least super-national struc-
tures as well. NAFTA and APEC aim at finding compromise and consen-
sus at a regional level as well, though the development may just have 
started. Still, those developments leave the classic mode of multilateral 
agreement behind. Agreements on a regional level display a new dimension 
of international cooperation. They differ significantly from traditional mul-
tilateral agreements: regional agreements are formed on a regional level 
within regional institutions, even if those are rather initial at an early stage 
of regional integration like a meeting of ministers in a working group. 
While governments foster regional decision-making, borders melt. As su-
per- or supranational decision-making develops, it becomes harder to dis-
tinguish regional decisions from genuine national decisions.  
The EU is a perfect example of a highly developed form of regional gov-
ernance: only in 1992, the year of the completion of the SEM, did the 
French  Conseil d’Etat find that 22.445 EC-regulations and 1.675 EC-Cordula Janowski 
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directives were in force in France (Janowski 2005b: 30). In certain years, 
the EU-Commission enacted up to 12,000 acts of EC-secondary law that 
entered into national law (Janowski 2005b: 51). This raised the questions of 
democratic legitimacy of regional decision-making. The democratic theory 
considers the nation state as a unit that is capable of guaranteeing demo-
cratic legitimacy and control (Böckenförde 1987). But does this automati-
cally apply to governance beyond the tight frames of the nation-state? 
Within the EU, the discussion started in the mid 1980s, when a member of 
the European Parliament criticized the decay of parliamentary influence on 
EC-legislation (Hänsch 1986). The debate that followed under the assump-
tion of a democratic deficit of the EU displays a major structural problem 
of regional integration. 
The main problem of a deep regionalism is the question of democratic ac-
countability (Coleman/Underhill 1998: 8). Citizens of nation states control 
political elites and their decisions by sanctioning their agenda during elec-
tions. But whom are the European citizens to control, if European elections 
still suffer from severe deficits as regards their democratic standard 
(Grimm 1994)? The debate is as well known as the arguments: European 
elections are general, liberal, secret, but not equal. Even to this day, the 
European Parliament’s powers to sanction the Council as well as the Euro-
pean Commission are insufficient, though the situation has improved. Still, 
regional entities, especially if they generate supranational decisions, have 
to guarantee the persistence of democratic accountability as the most essen-
tial feature of democracy (Böckenförde 1987: 919 f.). Regional entities suf-
fer from a paradox that is hard to overcome: while pooling of sovereignty 
may be a major goal as is the case for the EU, regional entities will have to 
respect the nation state as long as regional organizations have not deve-
loped into a nation state. In other words: democratic legitimacy of regional 
institutions is difficult as supranational entities need on the one hand insti-
tutions that monitor compliance of member-states with common rules, but 
they need at the same time intergovernmental institutions that preserve the 
prerogative of member-states especially as regards the transfer of powers. Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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To overcome those problems, scholars developed different models during 
the last decade.
8 One of the most favored seems to be the idea of a post-
parliamentary democracy. The idea is so popular among the political elites 
in Europe that the European Convention decided to establish this model in 
the European Constitution. According to Article I-46 TEC, the functioning 
of the EU “shall be founded on representative democracy”. At the same 
time, the EU commits itself to the principle of a participatory democracy 
(Article I-47 TEC). To realize this, the EU-institutions “shall maintain an 
open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and 
civil society”. This does not mean an open dialogue with the EU’s citizens 
as the Constitution states as well.  
To influence EU-decisions, citizens have to attract “not less than one mil-
lion” other EU-citizens of “a significant number of Member States”. When 
this requirement is fulfilled, citizens “may take the initiative” and invite the 
Commission “to submit any appropriate proposal”. Before citizens may try 
to fulfill these tough requirements, the EU-institutions have to enact a law 
that determines “the provisions for the procedures and conditions required 
for such a citizens' initiative” (Article I-47 No. 4. TEC). It will take time to 
enact such an EC-law. In contrast to this, members of the civil society – 
that is in fact lobbyists and other stakeholders – may start the dialogue on 
the basis of the Constitution right away. A secondary act is in their case not 
necessary. This shows that the EU-institutions find themselves very open to 
proposals of organized civil groups, but less open to proposals from citi-
zens. 
The idea of involving members of civil society in European decision-
making is shared also by core institutions of national and European admi-
nistration. The German Bundestag considers the participation of the civil 
society as essential for good governance (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 422 
f.). In 2001, the European Commission emphasized that there “needs to be 
a stronger interaction with regional and local governments and civil so-
ciety” (EU-Commission 2001: 4).
9 The necessary reforms of European 
 
8   For a detailed discussion see Janowski (2005a). 
9   To the European Commission, members of the civil society are: trade unions and 
employers’ organisations (“social partners”), nongovernmental organisations, pro-Cordula Janowski 
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government required the “concerted action” by all European institutions, 
member states, regional and local authorities as well as the civil society. 
Their “commitment to reforming European governance” was “essential” to 
regain “confidence” especially of European citizens (EU-Commission 
2001: 9). The Commission assumes that only members of the civil society 
can “mobilise people” and represented the interest of “those suffering from 
exclusion or discrimination” appropriately (EU-Commission 2001: 14).  
Some scholars see governance beyond parliamentary participation as the 
future model (Andersen/Burns 1996; Heritiér 1997). Due to them, main 
players of future European decisions are organized groups. Already today, 
those groups would influence European decisions significantly as espe-
cially the EU-Commission could hardly abandon the expertise of stake-
holders (Andersen/Burns 1996: 234). The future role of parliaments 
including the European Parliament is from the point of those approaches a 
rather limited one. The idea that the European Parliament or the national 
parliaments would influence European decisions sustainably appears to 
those scholars as “political myth” (Andersen/Burns 1996: 244). Especially 
the European Parliament was missing the legislative initiative as well as the 
right of final decision on EC-legislative acts. Apart from that, parliaments 
in Europe were increasingly overstrained with the complexity of European 
legislation. Therefore, post-parliamentary approaches plead to give up the 
illusion of a European parliamentary democracy in favour of a “direct par-
ticipation” of stakeholders with the result of a governance “of organisa-
tions, by organisations and for organisations” (Andersen/Burns 1996: 229). 
The expertise of stakeholders and similar groups of the civil society is es-
sential in national and European decision-making. The involvement of or-
ganized groups is therefore a functional necessity of any kind of political 
decision-making (Janowski 2005a: 816). Nevertheless, if stakeholders start 
to substitute parliamentary involvement, governance in Europe will lose 
democratic legitimacy the more stakeholders influence decisions. The main 
deficit of post-parliamentary approaches is that groups of the civil society 
 
fessional associations, charities, grass-roots organisations, organisations that in-
volve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from 
churches and religious communities (EU-Commission 2001: 14). Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
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lack democratic accountability. Therefore, they lack the most essential re-
quirement of legitimate exercise of power (Janowski 2005a: 815 ff.). 
Stakeholders can never exercise legitimate power in terms of democratic 
theory. This deficit is incurable as the cure went along with a public control 
of stakeholders. This contradicts the stakeholders’ right to exist: repre-
senting particular interest. The increasing influence of organized groups is 
in fact highly critical. Transparency is not the main problem: public debate 
may observe stakeholders’ decisions and analyze their value for the society. 
But it is de facto impossible to hold individual members of lobby groups 
politically responsible. Individuals from outside a civil group can neither 
force stakeholders to justify their actions, nor can outsiders influence the 
decision of stakeholders by voting for one or the other political agenda. 
Therefore, stakeholders act free of political responsibility to individuals 
outside their group (Langguth 2000: 9). In addition, no one outside the or-
ganization can hold stakeholders to account for decision by deselecting 
them or forcing them to resign. Therefore, post-parliamentary governance 
eliminates those strongest instruments of democratic control 
(Lord/Beetham 2001: 454). 
III. Conclusion: Globalization, Regional Integration and 
the EU 
This paper shows that globalization is neither the modern threat to civilized 
societies, nor is it a development that states may simply avoid. In fact, 
globalization is the continuation of international relations after the East 
West conflict. Nevertheless, things have changed. While states assigned 
themselves to one or the other of only two blocs in former times, the aims 
and opportunities of assignments have become manifold. In the competi-
tion of systems (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 51) between West and East, 
the ideal of a liberal democracy seems to have won. This goes along with 
the fact that most recent regional efforts aim at economic liberalization, 
while political integration is at best a long term goal. Regional integration 
very often aims at facilitating trade in a region (Laursen 1999: 67). This 
fosters prosperity and may also help to overcome intra-regional conflicts. Cordula Janowski 
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East Asia is a nice example for this: the EU accepted China’s “One China” 
policy against Taiwan with the belief that the growing economic exchange 
between both countries would calm the conflict. To foster this, the EU sup-
ported Taiwan’s accession to the WTO. For the EU-Commission, “increas-
ing economic integration” especially between China and Taiwan will 
eventually lead to a “resolution of the question of Taiwan” (EU-
Commission 2003). The EU may be proven right: economic relations be-
tween Taiwan and China grow constantly and have unfolded stabilizing 
effects (Shaocheng 2003: 19). 
While regional integration is the essential answer to globalization, it is use-
ful to abandon the idea that the “deep regionalism” (Laffan 1997: 1) pre-
sented by the EU could suit other regions. The process of European 
integration is far from being a model or even paradigm that could be copied 
one-to-one in any political surrounding. In fact, the EU is the result of his-
torical developments. Europeans had to overcome several setbacks on the 
way to deepening integration. The EU may provide other regions with sin-
gle strategies, for instance in economic integration. Still, the SEM and its 
specific legal basis cannot be isolated from the characteristic structure of 
the supranational EC. An EU-like regional integration requires the assign-
ment of powers to the regional level and the pooling of competencies. This 
unique characteristic of EU-integration may have caused anxious feelings 
from other nations. Some state that the EU, because of its “sheer size and 
economic strength” was “viewed with apprehension”. In fact, big countries 
like the US and Australia also protect their markets and are today far from 
a total abolishment of trade barriers to the advantage of third countries es-
pecially from the former “Third World”. All industrialized nations still ar-
gue on subsidies and monopolies that distort national as well as global 
competition. The assumption of a “fortress Europe mentality” (Murray 
2004: 37) would therefore apply to the US and Australia as well. Finally, 
the EU-Europe is in large parts independent from the world market. This 
may, for sure, cause distrust to others. 
Regional integration also helps to overcome the “fundamental problem” in 
traditional international relations: the problem of defection (Laursen 1999: 
74). Multi-national political agreements are fragile and steadily threatened Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU 
  33
by the non-commitment of single players. Changes in national interest easi-
ly change international preferences. Political actors will be “tempted to 
cheat or defect” from bi- or multilateral agreements in order to realize own 
interest (Laursen 1999: 74). The difficult relations between Taiwan and 
China are an example for this: for Taiwan, American interests in East-Asia 
have been of major importance, yet of changing reliability. The US is a key 
ally to Taiwan and supported the country during the crisis with China on 
the Taiwan Strait in 1996. Hence, US interests are ambiguous. While the 
US is interested in limiting China’s power, US companies cultivate strong 
economic relations with China (Shaocheng 2003: 21 ff.). The establishment 
of trade relations has turned out to be a successful strategy to stabilize the 
regions and overcome political conflicts (Laursen 1999: 75). Nevertheless, 
economic integration cannot guarantee stability and peace as long as co-
operation remains on a low degree of integration. The EU is an example 
that military aggression becomes less probable the more political integra-
tion develops. In other words: a deep form of regional integration is strong 
enough to almost guarantee stability and peace.  
The temptation to define the EU as model or even global paradigm of re-
gional integration is large. Yet, the EU is not suited for both. The EU is not 
a static concept (Kühnhardt 2004: 3). Its inner dynamics are to be seen in 
the context of European history as a whole. The neo-functionlist spill-over-
strategy that brought every policy to a European debate is one of the main 
reasons for the efficiency and speed of European integration. Nevertheless, 
the price was as high as could be: EU-member states had to sacrifice sover-
eignty. There is no higher sacrifice for nation states on the one hand. On 
the other hand, the EU also proves that giving up authority may lead to 
much bigger advantages than national solo strategies could ever provide. 
The fact that common strategies lead to better results in a globalized world 
may be the main lesson from EU-integration. Regional integration fosters 
cooperation and dialogue. Economic exchange leads to mutual advantages. 
Member-states will avoid aggression in favor of dialogue, the stronger in-
tra-regional ties become. Regional institution-building and formalization of 
processes support this even more. The main objectives of almost every re-
gional project become reality: economic prosperity as well as “regional Cordula Janowski 
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peace and stability” (ASEAN 2005: 1). To achieve those goals, states have 
to foster regional integration. This may be a painful process as the history 
of EU-integration shows. The EU can be a motivating factor for such de-
velopments. Nevertheless, European integration is not a political or eco-
nomic construction kit that provides flexible solutions. 
However we decide on globalization and regional integration, democratic 
governance will be a major issue. There is a common sense that good go-
vernance requires the respect of democratic principles. This paper shows 
that the “right” democratic concept may be disputed. In fact, there seems to 
be a tendency to involve civil groups much stronger in the process of su-
pranational decision-making than is today. The expertise of stakeholders is 
essential and useful. Nevertheless, their participation increases the EU’s 
democratic deficit as no one can hold stakeholders responsible – apart from 
themselves. Groups of the civil society elude from basic mechanisms of 
political control and sanction. Their elites are appointed by a privileged 
group of members. Their policy and decision makers are responsible to 
their own “club” only, but not to citizens or the society as a whole. Even if 
stakeholders feel responsible to the public and commit themselves to com-
mon welfare, they still act free of the danger to be deselected by citizens. 
No code of conduct can overcome this major deficit that is one of the most 
critical challenges which “governance beyond state” has to answer. 
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